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A Major Storm Hits a Forgotten Region and a Feeding
Frenzy Fails to Materialize: Hurricane Rita,
News Coverage, and Southeast Texas
BY JASON C. SIDES, JAMES VANDERLEEUW, AND TINA CAPELES

This paper considers the question of why the pattern of national media
coverage surrounding Hurricane Rita in Southeast Texas emerged as it
did. This coverage is noteworthy because, unlike other hurricanes, a media feeding frenzy did not occur. One possible explanation is that local
political culture influenced national media coverage of Hurricane Rita,
and we address this using original survey data collected from residents
of Southeast Texas in the aftermath of the storm. The responses provided
by residents indicate their actions created an environment in which a
feeding frenzy was unlikely to transpire.
Introduction
The impact of Hurricane Rita upon the region of Southeast Texas is a
very interesting period of history to study. This is due in large part to the
reaction of the local population to the weather event, a reaction derived
from the particular culture of this region. The culture of Southeast Texas
strongly emphasizes self reliance in the face of crisis, and does not place
great value on government dependence. The presence of this culture, we
argue, created an environment in which the impact of Hurricane Rita contributed to an evacuation that was diffuse and disorderly. This evacuation
engendered suffering for many local residents, although it was obscured
from national attention.
Jason Sides is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lamar
University.
James Vanderleeuw is a Professor of Political Science and the Jack
Brooks Chair of Government and Public Service at Lamar University.
Tina Cape/es is a Graduate Student in Political Science at Lamar
University.
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An investigation of the impact of Hurricane Rita on Southeast Texas
provides the opportunity to illustrate how the experiences of area residents were lost in the larger media coverage of this event, and why Hurricane Rita became something of a "forgotten storm."
We define Southeast Texas as the region encompassing Jefferson,
Orange and Hardin counties; these counties are either on or near the Gulf
of Mexico, in the southeastern corner of Texas. According to the 2010
census, approximately 388,000 people reside in these three counties.
Much of our focus will be on Jefferson County, which is by far the largest of the three counties. With a population slightly in excess of a quarter
million, Jefferson County makes up 65% of the three-county population.
How could the Hurricane experiences of such a large population come to
be essentially overlooked? We ask whether the practices of the national
media helped to account for why the story of this region's experience
with Hurricane Rita was obscured.
We argue that the unique circumstances of Hurricane Rita's impact
on Southeast Texas interacted with the practices of the national media to
obscure this event. To make this argument, we draw upon the often-cited research of media scholar Larry Sabato ( 1991 ), which argues that an
event receives the most focused national media attention, referred to as a
"feeding frenzy," when two conditions prevail. These conditions are met
when an event is dramatic, producing an intense level of human suffering,
and that it occurs infrequently. We explore the reasons why the effect of
Hurricane Rita on Southeast Texans failed to generate substantial national media attention even though the event itself can ostensibly be classified
as having met Sabato's conditions for pronounced coverage.
There is an absence of a detailed media record of how citizens evacuated from the landfall of Hurricane Rita. As a result, this lack has minimized the collective knowledge of what individuals actually did during
this time. We use original survey data collected in the weeks following
the storm to correct for this fundamental void of knowledge about what
the residents did during this crisis. Inclusion of this data into the public
record is important because it will address this lack of knowledge. We
argue that the absence of a concentrated public suffering from the effects
of the hurricane prevented the media from acquiring a target upon which
to focus their attention. The deficiency of a target upon which to focus
attention in turn prevented the media from constructing an accurate account of this disaster. This deficiency will need to be addressed if future
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generations are to understand what happened and the Hurricane Rita disaster not shrouded in a veil of misinformation and rumor.
In this paper, we attempt to illustrate how the choices made by the
citizens of Southeast Texas lead to a situation in which the national media was unable to focus on the plight of these individuals, and as a result,
were not subject of a media feeding frenzy. This is an important task because is will provide a clear account of how individual actions translate
into media coverage. Illustrating the context in which the media creates
news coverage is important because it will help individuals become better
consumers of media practices. It will also assist in further awareness of
why natural disasters are covered in the recent media.

Media Coverage and Natural Disasters
Most of the media coverage of Hurricane Rita focused on the impact
to the Houston metropolitan area, which diverted attention from the effects on Southeast Texas (McBride, 2011). Media practices influence
the story selection process, thereby, in part, accounting for the pattern of
media coverage observed during Hurricane Rita. Sabato (1991) notes the
media normally chooses subjects for news stories based on the perception of viewer interest in order to maximize viewership because higher
ratings allow these outlets to charge greater fees for commercial time
during newscasts. However, each media outlet recognizes the presence
of competition for viewers (Bennett, 1995). This competition results in
the converging by multiple news organizations upon a single topic with
ever increasing intensity. The outcome of this process is labeled a feeding frenzy by Sabato (1991 ). The failure of a feeding frenzy to emerge
during Hurricane Rita is highly unexpected. The absence of a feeding
frenzy prevented the existence of a great deal of national televised coverage about the storm.
A feeding frenzy is an event that can have significant consequences
for how a news story is covered within the media. A feeding frenzy
ensures that a single story will receive substantial coverage among competing news outlets during a short period of time. As some media outlets
begin to cover this increasingly recognized event, pressure builds for additional media organizations to cover the same story. Increasingly, this
news story will begin to appear among all media outlets as the preeminent
news event. The amount of coverage ultimately will be so substantial that
the story at the center of a feeding frenzy will appear to be the only news89
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worthy event occurring in the nation to many viewers. This will ensure
that the viewing public will be oversaturated with awareness of this one
story, while other stories and topics are overlooked.
While there are obvious negative aspects of this outcome, resulting
from the fact that other worthy events receive minimal attention as the
public is inundated with reports of one event, there is a benefit. That benefit is that there is national media coverage. The media coverage referred
to in the following discussion is national news coverage; this is the type
of coverage that was denied to the residents of Southeast Texas during
Hurricane Rita. The public was overlooking the likely result to these individuals when attention could have contributed to greater contributions.
The particular response of Southeast Texas residents to Hurricane
Rita contributed to the conditions in which a feeding frenzy would not
emerge. As a result of these factors, national news coverage focused on
the experiences of those fleeing Houston. To illustrate our argument, we
draw upon data from a survey of Jefferson County, Texas residents taken
shortly after the event. To the extent that Southeast Texans did not turn
to government for assistance and to the extent that as a result of evacuation, Southeast Texans were dispersed geographically, we argue that
the conditions for a feeding frenzy to emerge were not met. As Sabato
( 1991) notes, the first condition for a feeding frenzy to emerge is the presence of a story that will capture the viewers' attention due to its dramatic
nature. The response of Southeast Texans provided an environment in
which there were too few examples of suffering to generate the type of
pictures that would grasp the public's attention. Consequently, there was
little motivation for a media feeding frenzy to begin. In its absence, the
storm's easily observable impact on Southeast Texas and upon area residents would fail to emerge in any substantial manner.
Hurricane Rita

Hurricane Rita would make landfall in Southeast Texas shortly after
the nation confronted the crisis wrought by Hurricane Katrina. The spectacle of a major American city falling victim to the forces unleashed by
both the storm and the ill prepared response of government received a
great deal of media attention. The images of people suffering during the
storm and its aftermath would dominate the media cycle for many weeks
as the American public turned in to watch was occurring in New Orleans (Thibodeux, 2012). This coverage likely influenced how the residents
90
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of Southeast Texas would view the possible threat that Hurricane Rita
posed. Many would respond to the new storm with the images of Hurricane Katrina fresh in their minds (McBride, 2011 ). The impact of this
powerful storm created a situation in which residents of Southeast Texas
became sensitive to the threat posed by any hurricane (Roddy, 2005). As
a result, individuals were paying attention to the threat posed when Hurricane Rita became a reality in the region.
On September 24, 2005, Southeast Texas was hit by the fourth most
powerful storm on record in the Atlantic region, Hurricane Rita (National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 2005). Rita
entered the Gulf of Mexico on Tuesday, September 20, where she quickly grew to a category five storm, with sustaining winds of 175 miles per
hour (NOAA, 2005). Evacuation was recommended in Jefferson County
on Wednesday, September 21, and then elevated to mandatory the following day, Thursday, September 22. Rita made landfall at 2:38 am, Saturday, September 24, hitting northeast of Sabine Pass and heading toward
Jasper, Texas. Upon landfall, Rita was a powerful category 3 hurricane
with sustaining winds of 120 miles per hour (Roddy, 2005).
Rita caused as much as 10 billion dollars in total damage of both
insured and uninsured losses along the entire gulf coast (NOAA, 2005),
and up to 85 million dollars of damage in Jefferson County alone (Stone
and Macias, 2005). In addition to property damage, the region's most
populous county, Jefferson County, experienced population loss. One of
that county's two largest cities, Port Arthur, for example, may have lost
nearly 10% of its population as a result of the storm. Countywide there
were numerous business losses. Losses among the business community
presented a threat to regional economic recovery to the point that many
feared it might be years before business activity returns to its pre-Rita
level (Roddy, 2005). The cost in terms of human suffering could not be
readily measured.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Rita, many local leaders complained
regarding the unwillingness of many citizens to evacuate in a timely manner, or once a mandatory evacuation was called for, the unwillingness
of some citizens to wait for the officially designated hour before leaving
home (McBride, 2011). The inability to convince many citizens to evacuate during designated times in fact contributed to massive traffic congestion during the evacuation (Texas House of Representatives, 2006).
Citizens, however, did not accept the blame for this situation as many
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complained about the lack of a clearly articulated evacuation procedure,
a lack of sufficient shelters, and the general chaotic situation that resulted
(Texas House of Representatives, 2006). Both local leaders and citizens
would express the view that the evacuation could have benefitted from
more coordination from sources beyond local governments (McBride,
2011).
The lack of a professionally coordinated evacuation process contributed to a chaotic scene in which citizens were forced to rely on their own
efforts to remove themselves from the storm's impact. In an interesting
way, this was perhaps what might be expected given the region's political culture. Derived from the work of scholar Daniel Elazar (1966),
the United States can be viewed as exhibiting three political cultures.
The first culture is best described as traditionalistic where an emphasis is
placed on societal hierarchy, and governance is the domain of economic
and social elites. The second culture is termed moralistic where an emphasis is placed on government providing for the wellbeing of society,
and where public service is seen as a noble calling. Third, Elazar (1966)
identifies an individualistic culture where an emphasis is placed on individual self-reliance and responsibility, and government is to be kept to a
minimum. The prevalence of a given political culture is associated with
region. For instance, the moralistic political culture historically has been
reflected in the New England region and along the northern tier of the
United States.
Political culture can be understood as a filter through which information is interpreted, and can therefore influence peoples' attitudes and
behavior. Citizens in Texas have been classified as reflecting the individualistic political culture, where people succeed or fail on their own
merits and "government that governs best, governs least." The political
orientation of Southeast Texans can certainly be understood from this
perspective. As a group, Southeast Texans expect little of government
and anticipate scant assistance from officials in time of need. Rather,
reflecting a "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" mentality, they look to
their own devices and assistance from family and neighbors.
As Dwyer (2005) notes, Southeast Texans evacuated the region when
they felt their family and loved ones were in danger, and in this way prevented a feeding frenzy from emerging. Their willingness to act prevented the media from engaging in a feeding frenzy because they evacuated
their families all across the south central United States. Consequently,
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they were too diffuse and too hard to identify to allow the media to focus
upon them while covering the impact of Hurricane Rita. Another aspect
of the political culture characterizing this region is that individuals often
do not complain when government fails. This is attributable to the fact
that this culture does not expect much from government. If government
fails, then individuals within this culture are not shocked because they
never expected government to do much for their situation. Such a perspective minimizes the extent to which they will voice their dissatisfaction with government's performance.
Another factor that contributed to the absence of a feeding frenzy can
be found in the fact that Southeast Texas is only a short drive from Houston, which is the nation's third largest metropolitan area. The storm's
potential impact on such a large city and the possible parallels between
Rita's impact on Houston and that of Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans
created a unique choice for the media. These factors created a situation
in which the national media could not be sure that leaving Houston would
not leave them in a position where they could not focus on the story in
that city. The national media, when it covered the impact to Southeast
Texas, focused almost exclusively on concerns about the regions' economic base, the oil industry (Thibodeux, 2012). Although the impact to
a major industry is clearly important, this does not justify the fact that
the individuals of Southeast Texas were largely forgotten in the national
reporting upon the storm damaged area.

The Survey
To illustrate citizens' experience during Hurricane Rita, we employ
the results of a random phone survey of registered voters in Jefferson
County, Texas conducted during February and March, 2006. This survey
asked citizens a series of questions related to two broad areas: their experiences during the evacuation from Hurricane Rita, and their experiences
during the hurricane recovery process. Citizens were asked questions
such as whether they evacuated, how far they traveled, how long they
were away from home and where they stayed, their major source of information when they were away, and their biggest concerns during both
evacuation and recovery. Survey results are discussed below and reported in the following tables. Question wording is in italics at the top of each
table; column percentages in a table may not add to 100 due to rounding.
National media attention might have converged on Southeast Texas
93
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and Southeast Texans at several points during the crisis. National media
attention might have come during the evacuation process, or immediately
after the storm via stories of those who stayed behind, or directly after
evacuation as citizens were hunkered down away from home, or upon the
return of evacuees as the region sought to rebuild and regain a semblance
of normalcy. At none of these points, however, was there a clear opening
for a media frenzy to develop.
Sabato (1991) argues that the first condition for a feeding frenzy to
emerge is the presence of an event, such as a natural disaster and the suffering it causes. Such an event will capture the attention and imagination
of the viewing audience. It has been noted most of the attention associated with Hurricane Rita turned to the Houston metropolitan area as thousands began to evacuate in the wake of Rita. But the communities across
Southeast Texas were also dealing with the approaching catastrophic hurricane and local governments were also preparing for a full-scale evacuation in an attempt to get out of harm's way (National Climatic Data
Center, 2005). This illustrated the extent to which the focus was drawn
to the Houston metropolitan region.
The most observable impact wrought by the storm in Southeast Texas
stemmed from property damage (McBride, 2011). This was the most
observable impact of the storm because the citizens did not wait to leave
the region in search of shelter. Overwhelmingly, Jefferson County citizens evacuated prior to Hurricane Rita (Dwyer, 2005). In response to the
question, "Did you evacuate or did you stay?" Jefferson County citizens
overwhelmingly (96%) reported having evacuated. Only 3% said that
they stayed, and l % reported being out of the region when their community was struck by the storm (N=353). The widespread evacuation
of residents before the storm minimized the likelihood that a large number of Southeast Texans would be concentrated in any specific shelter or
evacuation center, and as a result, minimized the probability that the first
condition for a feeding frenzy would emerge.
Why did so many people leave the region in the face of Hurricane
Rita? The high percentage of people that chose to evacuate might point
to a level of compliance with the evacuation order, which should provide confidence to political leaders that the people are willing to follow
instructions during times of disaster. However, the high percentage of
citizens evacuating might be attributed to extenuating circumstances.
One extenuating circumstance was the proximity to Hurricane Katrina.
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Hurricane Rita was only a month after Hurricane Katrina and people had
been inundated with the destructive power of hurricanes. The images
of the aftermath of Katrina likely frightened many who otherwise might
have remained, into evacuating in the wake of Rita. Another extenuating
circumstance likely was the intensity of the storm itself that encouraged
people to evacuate. Before landfall, Hurricane Rita was classified as a
category 5 on the Saffir-Simpson scale. The combination of these extenuating circumstances provided a strong basis for evacuation.
Respondents were also asked to specify their biggest concern during
their evacuation from Hurricane Rita. This was an open-ended question
that provided respondents the opportunity to provide their concerns in
their own words. Table 1 reports responses to this question. Slightly
more than one out of three respondents (36%) reported possible damage
to their home and property as their biggest concern. Once having evacuated, many Southeast Texans focused their attention away from their
immediate personal safety to the safety of their largest investment, their
home.

Table 1: What was your biggest concern during the hurricane?

Damage to house/property
Evacuation process
Safety of self/family
Nothing remaining when return
Medical/health problems
Everything of concern
Other
No concerns
(N=350)

36%
29%
20%
3%
2%
1%
7%
2%

Another area of major concern evacuees felt during the evacuation
process rested in the nature of the evacuation process itself and included
comments relating to traffic conditions and travel time, getting to a destination, and the availability of gas. This type of response was mentioned
by nearly one in three respondents (29% ). While Southeast Texans may
have generally complied with evacuation orders, we see that they were

95

EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOURNAL

unhappy with the actual process of evacuating from the region. The
lesson for the future rests in the dissatisfaction pointing to a need for
government officials to better coordinate the evacuation and strategically
position fuel supply in future evacuations.
The final major area of concern to residents while evacuating, the
safety for one's self, family and friends, was expressed by about one in
five respondents (20%). For some, a major concern during evacuation
was the safety of loved ones. The specter of becoming a victim of Hurricane Rita was a concern that haunted many who fled the region while
they were leaving their homes. A number of other issues were also of
concern to some residents when evacuating from the region. As seen in
Table 1, concerns about the impact of evacuation on the future health of
family members, the fear that there would be nothing left to return to,
issues about evacuation preparation, obtaining information, and specific
references to the weather were also felt by evacuees.
Together these responses highlight the extent to which individuals
were motivated to leave the region and avoid much of the suffering experienced by those within the impact zone of Hurricane Katrina. The
strength of Rita as it approached landfall combined with the images from
Katrina likely account for the absence of a large population of non-evacuees, left behind to cope with the storm's landfall and to be the subject of
media coverage about the toll exacted by the storm. Thus, we see that the
first condition for the emergence of a feeding frenzy failed to materialize.
Residents of Southeast Texas did evacuate and did not stay behind to witness the storm first hand. Even though the preconditions for this type of
media coverage did not materialize, one may consider whether a lesser, or
even later, feeding frenzy might have emerged in the wake of Hurricane
Rita's landfall in Southeast Texas.
A later feeding frenzy might have occurred had people evacuated
Southeast Texas to some common area outside the region. Another possible cause of the emergence of a feeding frenzy would have originated
with a large degree of suffering among those trying to flee the storm's
impact. However, the residents of Southeast Texas did not evacuate to
a common area or experience massive suffering akin to that witnessed
during Hurricane Katrina just weeks earlier. Both of these facts helped
contribute to a situation in which again the initiation of a feeding frenzy
was prevented because the media was denied a target upon which to center their attention.
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The evacuation started as weather forecasters indicated that the storm
would weaken as it approached landfall somewhere along the border of
the Texas/Louisiana coastline (National Climatic Data Center, 2005). Indeed, on the 22 of September the eye of the storm weakened, and would
continue to gradually weaken over the next couple days to become a category 3 storm before slamming into the gulf coast on September 24 (National Climatic Data Center, 2005). The projected path of the storm was
thought to reach as far as 150 miles north of Southeast Texas, nearing the
Texas-Louisiana-Arkansas border. It was projected to reach the Texarkana area with hurricane-sustained winds. The reports transmitted in the
days and hours prior to the storm provided an image for all to see, but
offered little certainty for the people of Southeast Texas as to what action
should be taken, specifically regarding where to evacuate to.
Respondents were asked in a series of questions to recount factual
information about their experience during the evacuation. One question
was how far they travelled as the result of evacuation. As reported in
Table 2, the majority reported travelling at least 300 miles, half traveled
up to 300 miles from home, while about one out of three (32%) travelled
over 300 miles. Slightly fewer than one in five traveled less than 100
miles. These findings illustrate the extent to which residents of the region
dispersed across a vast distance; they also highlight the extent to which
the conditions surrounding the evacuation were unfavorable to the emergence of a feeding frenzy.
Table 2: When you evacuated, about how far did you travel?

More than 300 miles
Up to 300 miles
Up to 100 miles
50 miles or less
Don't know
(N=338)

32%
50%
15%
1%
2%

Another factor working against the emergence of a feeding frenzy
was the nature of suffering experienced by Southeast Texans during the
evacuation. Despite government efforts to ensure a mandatory evacuation, the pilgrimage to safer ground became problematic for most evacuees.
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Most residents of Southeast Texas traveled north in the direction of cities
like Lufkin, Nacogdoches, and Tyler to escape the storm (Texas House of
Representative, 2006). The services needed in the wake of evacuation
orders, however, were poorly implemented. Services were scarce along
the designated evacuation routes, which contributed to people becoming abandoned on the side of the road (Texas House of Representatives,
2006). Those lucky enough to avoid such a fate were left to travel north
at an idle pace to reach destinations.
Aside from the difficulties faced on the road, evacuees also faced
difficulties in their hosting communities. Government officials along the
evacuation route were unprepared for the numbers of people traveling to
their communities. This lack of preparedness contributed to a shortage of
food, gas, sanitation, and lodging (Koonce, 2005). Once on evacuation
routes, people were not permitted to leave the highway except for the fuel
that was in very short supply along these routes. The heavy numbers of
residents leaving Southeast Texas contributed to a backup of traffic along
evacuation routes, and was compounded by a lack of coordination among
all levels of government to open all traffic lanes for evacuation.
While enduring these problems was unpleasant, these indignities
were not of the same level as those seen in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina (Texas House of Representative, 2005). While evacuees of
Southeast Texas faced food shortages, they were not forced to engage in
scavenging to find food, like many who remained in New Orleans (Texas Department of Public Safety, 2005). The fact that suffering during
Hurricane Rita was not as intense as that witnessed in the Crescent City
during Hurricane Katrina further minimized the likelihood of a feeding
frenzy. Hurricane Rita human interest stories were not as compelling as
were the images drawn from New Orleans during and immediately after
Hurricane Katrina.
Another factor shaping the perception of suffering was the fact that
Rita evacuees were not concentrated in shelters. Table 3 reports where
respondents said they stayed during the evacuation. The majority of
Rita evacuees stayed with relatives (57%), although sizable percentages stayed in a motel (18%) or with friends (12%). 5% of respondents
reported either having stayed in a shelter or in their second home, such
as a lake house. A remnant of evacuees stayed in other places such as a
church, a motor home, or in their cars situated in a parking lot ahead of
the storm's landfall.
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Table 3: For most ofthe time that you evacuated, where did you mostly stay?
Relatives
Motel
Friends
Second home
Shelter
Other
(N=330)

57%
18%
12%
5%
5%
4%

The fact that residents of Southeast Texas were not concentrated in
one area complicated the ability of the media to engage in a feeding frenz;y. This is because it was logistically too difficult to find large numbers
of victims to feature in any new stories. It would prove to be much easier
to focus on large numbers of individuals dealing with the aftermath of the
storm when producing news stories. Such a concentration of individuals would easily be found in metropolitan Houston, which represented a
better setting for media figures. Driving about eastern Texas looking for
evacuees would simply be too inefficient to allow reporters to meet their
deadlines.
A further problem complicating the ability of reporters to initiate a
feeding frenz;y while covering Hurricane Rita was the extent to which
residents of Southeast Texas were away from home. Most citizens who
evacuated stayed away from home for about two to three weeks. As
reported in Table 4, nearly one in five stayed away for about one week
(19%), more than two out of five were away for about two weeks (42%),
more than one in four were away for about three weeks (28%), and one in
ten reported being away from home for more than three weeks. The long
length of time away from home minimized the likelihood these individuals would be able to provide reporters with stories about their experiences
fleeing Hurricane Rita, and provided further difficulties for media coverage to follow the pattern of a feeding frenz;y.
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Table 4: For how long were you away from home?
1 week or less
2 weeks
3 weeks
More than 3 weeks
Don't know
(N=337)

19%
42%
28%
10%
3%

The conditions for the emergence of a feeding frenzy were further
complicated by the fact that evacuees were devoid of a significant amount
of information about the storm's impact on Southeast Texas. Individuals
were simply unable to obtain accurate information from their communities, which caused many to delay their return home (McBride, 2011).
Lack of information about what was happening "back home" caused
many evacuees to stay were they had evacuated. While those who evacuated relied on numerous sources of information, television topped the list
as the major news source. As reported in Table 5, two out of five relied
on television as their major news source (41 %). A substantial percentage
also relied on radio with than more than one in five (23%). Nearly one
fifth said that they relied on friends and family (19%), and more than one
in ten relied on the Internet (13%). Numerous other sources of information were also used, but less frequently; a few respondents reported
getting information from other sources, such as from police departments,
from local business establishments, or from talking to people at a shelter.

Table 5: While you were evacuated,from where did you mostly get
your information about what was going on hack in your community?
41%
23%
19%
13%
3%
1%

Television
Radio
Friends & family
Internet
Other
No source of information
(N=333)
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The lack of suitable information for these individuals is further illustrated by the fact that the main information source for citizens varied depending upon how far they traveled and their age. The distance
away from home that was experienced during the evacuation heavily influenced the sources of media people relied upon. This is illustrated in
Table 6, which recounts the responses collected during the survey. Radio
decreased markedly as a main source of information the further citizens
traveled from home. For those who traveled up to 100 miles, radio was
the most frequently relied on information source (43%). By contrast,
less than one in ten of those who traveled more than 300 miles relied on
radio (8% ). Reliance on television increased dramatically as the distance
traveled from home increased. While about one in three who traveled up
to 100 miles relied on television (30% ), half of those who traveled more
than 300 miles relied on television as their main source of information.
The Internet, in addition to family and friends, also increased as main
sources of information the further that people traveled from home. The
reliance of evacuees upon these sources of information created a situation
in which residents of Southeast Texas faced difficulty obtaining information about their homes.
Table 6: The Main Source of Information by Distance Traveled
to 100 miles
Television
30%
43%
Radio
Family & Friends
5%
Internet
7%
(54)
N=

to 300 miles
39%
26%
18%
13%
(166)

over 300 miles
50%
8%
23%
17%
(104)

The type of news source relied upon by those away from their homes
matters because it shaped their awareness of the conditions in their neighborhoods. The further away from home these individuals were, the more
they relied upon television which had little incentive to provide vast
amounts of information about the impact of the storm in Southeast Texas.
The main result of this was to create some uncertainty about whether and
when to return. This contributed to an absence of evacuees returning
home at the same time in large numbers, and therefore handicapped the
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media's story line in this regard. That said, it remained possible that significant media coverage of Southeast Texas might converge around the
recovery stage. Even this, though, failed to materialize.
The recovery stage presented the possibility that the focus of media
coverage would obscure the storm's impact. As mentioned above, the
first condition for a feeding frenzy to emerge involves the ability of the
media to cover a story involving human suffering. If the media faces an
impossible task in attracting viewers, then many in the media may find it
in their interest to tum to other news events. The media coverage of an
event in such situations may become sporadic, and as a result, focused
among fewer media outlets. In the context of Hurricane Rita, this would
imply there would need to be a concentration of victims fleeing the storm,
or impacts to business. The question that must be asked is whether Hurricane Rita's impact would meet this condition.
In instances where news coverage does center upon topics that generate significant interest among the public, the next condition that must
exist is for the event to hold the audience's attention for a period of time.
Sabato (1991) finds that if the first condition is met, then the second condition for a feeding frenzy to emerge is that the subject matter must be
novel or shocking in order to generate interest among viewers. Without
this condition being met, there is little likelihood viewers will become invested in the story, and as a result, little incentive for the media to saturate
news coverage with a topic. The question that must be asked is whether
this condition was met by the recovery stage of Hurricane Rita.
The responses collected by respondents shed light on the extent to
which this was possible. In addition to the evacuation process, respondents were asked about their experiences during the hurricane recovery
process. Specifically, citizens were asked an open-ended question about
their biggest concern during recovery from Hurricane Rita. Results are
reported in Table 7. The most frequent response was about repairs to
one's home and property. The responses included general comments
about the need to repair or fix damages, the need for more rapid repairs,
and specific comments such as the need for roof repairs and the need for
available contractors and repair people. 25% of surveyed citizens referred
to repairs to home and property as their main concern. Other concerns included the existence of debris and Hurricane Rita's adverse impact on the
region's economy, both cited by 15% ofrespondents. Assistance to those
in need, such as the elderly, the displaced, and those without insurance
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was mentioned by 10% of respondents. Another concern rested in the
general expression that the region needed to recover and/or reestablish
normalcy. A total of 9% of all respondents offered this choice as their
main concern with the recovery from Hurricane Rita's impact.
A number of other concerns about the recovery process were also
expressed. The opinion that services such as electricity and safe drinking
water should have been provided more quickly or still needed to be provided were cited by 7% of all respondents; another 5% mentioned problems with insurance companies as a huge problem in the aftermath of the
storm. A series of responses that included generalized concern about the
future, about safety, about the need for greater individual self reliance,
emotional impact, and specifically about medical conditions and schools
each received 2% or less ofresponses. About 4% ofrespondents said that
they either had no concerns regarding the recovery, or were pleased with
the pace of recovery to that point.

Table 7: What has been your biggest concern as our region recovers
from Hurricane Rita?
Repairs/home
Debris
Economy
Assistance
Normalcy/recovery
Services
Insurance
Emotional concerns
What the future will bring
Other
No concerns/pleased with progress

25%
15%
15%
10%
9%
7%
5%
2%
2%
6%
4%

(N=331)

Collectively, these responses indicate the respondents' experience in
the aftermath of Hurricane Rita focused on issues that might be expected
in the aftermath of any large storm. Thus, the media was prevented from
gaining a novel topic upon which to focus their coverage of the response
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to Hurricane Rita. That patching roofs and cleaning downed tree limbs
in the aftermath of the storm was something on the minds of those living
within Southeast Texas is not a surprise. Had a massive number of homes
been destroyed or significant infrastructure been disrupted a frenzy might
have emerged. However these conditions were absent.

Discussion and Conclusion
Our central question was whether the public's response to Hurricane
Rita helped to account for the lack of national media coverage devoted
to Southeast Texas. The collective responses of those within the area
of Hurricane Rita's landfall were largely focused on their own efforts
to overcome the situation they were facing. Consequently, their time
and toil was directed to dealing with the immediate situation they faced
during landfall and during the storm's aftermath. This ensured that
Southeast Texans were less accessible to the media reporting on the story
in the area, if the media wanted to interview them. The general lack of
planning for an evacuation of Southeast Texas also further contributed
to dispersing those evacuating from the region to the point where finding
significant concentrations of these individuals was next to impossible.
The law of diminishing returns prevented many media actors from combing the thickets of east Texas in the hopes of finding people to interview.
Instead the media actors reported on the experiences of those city leaders
and businesses in east Texas who were forced to deal with the evacuees
of Hurricane Rita.
Had the media found and interviewed evacuees in greater numbers,
they may have heard dissatisfaction with the way government responded
and had a media story involving the suffering oflarge numbers of people.
The pictures of such coverage would have provided more incentive for
the national viewing audience to care about an evacuation in an unfamiliar portion of Texas. While local residents evacuated for Rita because of
the intensity of the storm and the fresh memories associated with Hurricane Katrina, this did not translate into the display of mass suffering
witnessed in the wake of Katrina. Consequently, the impact of Hurricane
Rita in Southeast Texas would not receive the attention it deserved. An
interesting question this raises is whether a competition arose between
Southeast Texas and New Orleans for the media's attention because Hurricane Rita transpired so soon after Hurricane Katrina, and the aftermath
so much apparently worse in New Orleans.
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In the future, natural disasters will continue to be overlooked if victims do not leave in such high numbers as to provide a concentrated spectacle of suffering. Those covering another natural disaster will again fail
to provide a complete historical account of the disaster's human cost.
Media coverage will continue to focus on areas with large populations.
This will ensure that large metropolitan areas will be the subject of most
media coverage, and quite possibly benefit from that coverage by being
in the minds of the nation.
The lesson for communities outside major metropolitan areas is
that the lack of concentrated suffering may prevent the impact of any
natural disaster in their area from being recognized. In real terms, those
displaced and homeless within these areas may not receive the attention
of the media their suffering deserves. In the context of Southeast Texas,
this would imply that citizens residing in areas like Houston will always
be the subject of media attention, while those in Port Arthur, Winnie, or
Beaumont suffer in the shadows.
Future coverage of natural disasters in smaller communities may exhibit a similar pattern. This paper investigated the process by which the
media coverage of a community's response to a natural disaster became
a forgotten event outside the area itself. The occurrence of a hurricane
is an event that can unleash unimaginable horrors on a community in a
matter of hours. The full force of nature's fury should create a record of
destruction the media would record. That they do not provide a historical
account because of the motivation to be profitable is an important
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